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favored fixed-interest obligations during this period, partly for various
reasons suggested above, the exceptionally wide spread between bond
and stock yields appears less surprising than at first.
V. FUTURE TRENDS IN PERSONAL INTEREST INCOME
A comprehensive analysis of probable future trends in personal in-
terest income would involve detailed consideration of a large number of
complex influences. In an immediate sense the amount of direct per-
sonal interest income will be determined, of course, by the volume of
public and private debt held by individuals and the level and move-
ment of interest rates. But a host of intricate and interacting causal
forces will be operating behind these immediate determinants.
The amount of public debt available for private investment, for
example, will be determined partly by unpredictable events, such as
war and business depression, and partly by deliberate decisions, to be
made from year to year, with respect to the level of federal, state, and
local government expenditures, the extent to which the latter are to
be financed by borrowing rather than current taxation, and the pro-
vision for retiring or otherwise removing debt from the investment
markets—including such quasi retirements as the important amounts
acquired each year by the social security and other governmental
trust funds.
Changes in the volume of private debt will be influenced by all the
varied forces that determine the amount of private new capital forma-
tion. These include the actual and expected state of business, the
demands upon the physical capacity of public utility and other im-
portant capital-using industries, the degree to which important tech-
nological changes occur that create opportunities for profitable large-
scale investment, the amount of residential construction made profit-
able by population growth, geographical shifts in population, obsoles-
cence, and the terms of mortgage financing, etc.
But the extent to which private new capital formation will lead to
growth in private debt will in turn depend upon still other factors.
These include, among others, the volume of funds becoming available
for investment to financial institutions through net receipts from in-
dividuals, the amounts becoming available to business corporations
each year from retained earnings and depreciation charges, and the
relative popularity of bonds and mortgages as against common and
preferred stocks among investors.
Of the total amount of public and private debt made available for
investment, the amounts to be held directly by individuals will be1310 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
affected by the competition of banks, insurance companies, pension
funds and other institutional investors for debt obligations, and by the
extent to which individuals are moved to use their savings to pay off
home mortgages and to add to their life insurance policies and annuity
and pension contracts, etc., instead of acquiring interest-yielding in-
vestments directly.
The level and movements of interest rates will be profoundly in-
fluenced, of course, by the policies of the Federal Reserve System, as
well as by the myriad other factors operating upon the supply of and
demand for loanable funds.
Without attempting a detailed quantitative analysis of the foregoing
and other forces, it may nevertheless be useful to note broadly a few
general tendencies.
1. Long-term uptrend in totalofpvblic and private debt
With only short-lived interruptions the total of net interest-bearing
public and private debt in the United States has been increasing for
many years (Table 6). It rose from $106 billion to $474 billion between
1918 and 1952, or by an average of $11 billion a year. The cumulative
or compound rate of increase was aboutper cent a year. The only
individual years in which the total did not rise were the depression
years 1931—1933 and 1938, and the year 1946, when the Treasury re-
tired $20 billion of debt with surplus funds part of which it had ob-
tained through its Victory Loan only a few months previously.
The largest single source of increase in 1918—1952 was the expansion
in the federal debt that accompanied World Wars I and II. Neverthe-
less the growth of private debt and that of state and local governments
accounted for 45 per cent of the total debt expansion in this period.
The aggregate amount of nonfederal debt outstanding declined in
each of the depression years, 1931—1935 and 1938, as well as in the
early war years of 1942—1943, but rose in all the other years of the
period.
2. Possible decline in net federal debt
Barring a change in traditional federal budget practice, no large
increase, if any, is to be expected, except during periods of war or
business depression, in the net federal debt—the amount in other hands
than federal trust funds and credit agencies. On the contrary, the
steady absorption of the federal debt by federal trust funds and credit
agencies, averaging $2.8 billion annually in 1944—1954, reduces by a
like amount the volume of federal securities that would otherwise beINTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1311
available to private investors. Hence, a balanced federal budget in the
legislative and administrative sense, which includes provision for
additions to the reserves or the trust funds, may mean in the future a
reduction of perhaps $3 billion or more a year in the net interest-bearing
federal debt outstanding in private hands. In this sense the operation
of the social security and other government trust funds may be re-
garded as having the same effect as a sinking fund of like magnitude
for reducing the amount of public debt in private hands. Some who
fear that this rate of debt reduction would absorb too much of tax-
payers' incomes in ordinary times have proposed that Congress seek
to balance only the cash budget: that is, to raise only enough tax reve-
nue each year to meet the year's actual cash expenditures, including
outpayments by the social security and other trust funds, but not
additions to their reserves. Others regard the public debt acquired
by the social security and other trust funds as not extinguished, but
alive, and as representing the funded portion of the government's
growing obligations under these trust funds. By gradually transferring
the privately held federal debt to the trust funds, the federal govern-
ment lightens its interest obligations to private holders as its social
security obligations increase.
3. Special stimulants aided high rate of private debt expansion after
World War II
The net interest-bearing federal debt declined by $24 billion between
the ends of 1945 and 1953, most of the decline being accounted for by
the 1946 redemptions noted above. But other borrowers, most notably
home buyers, business corporations, and state and local governments
have been increasing their interest-bearing debts at a record rate since
the end of World War II. Private and state and local government debt
more than doubled in the eight years ended in 1953. The average an-
nual increase in short- and long-term nonfederal interest-bearing debt
in these eight years was $21 billion, and in long-term alone, $14 bfflion.
The largest expansion in long-term obligations took place in the non-
corporate mortgage debt, which rose in the eight years from $32 billion
to $92 billion. Corporate long-term debt advanced from $38 billion to
$79 billion; the nonmortgage debt of unincorporated business, farmers,
and consumers, from $20 to $53 billion; state and local government
debt, from $13 to $30 billion; and farm mortgages, included above in
the noncorporate mortgage debt, from $5 to $8 billion.
Clearly if any such rate of growth were to continue, the total of
personal interest income, direct and indirect, would tend to rise rapidly
and substantially—barring a major decline in interest rates.1312 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
The great expansion of private and state and local government debt
in 1946—1953 was a natural accompaniment of the enormous upsurge
in investment that then occurred, for the greatest part of additions to
interest-bearing debt is normally incurred to help finance new invest-
ment. Gross private domestic investment (as measured by the Depart-
ment of Commerce), which was $16.2 billion in 1929, the previous peak
year, averaged $42.6 billion annually in the eight years ending in 1953,
and exceeded $50 billion in four of them.
The exceptional volume of new investment and debt in the years
immediately following World War II doubtless owed much to special
influences, some of which have lost their force. The period benefited
from the pent-up capital needs accumulated during the depression and
war for all manner of buildings and durable producers' and consumers'
goods, and for the replenishment of inventories at all levels of produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption.
Beginning about the middle of 1950, further stimulus to investment
and to borrowing was provided by large-scale orders for military ma-
terials and equipment for the Korean War. A special incentive to a
wide range of new investment was added by a law permitting business
enterprises to write off in five years, for tax purposes, varying propor-
tions of the cost of all projects for capital expenditures that were
adjudged by the Office of Defense Mobilization to contribute to mili-
tary defense.
The then-prevailing high rates of corporate income and excess
profits taxes, coupled with the expectation that these rates would be
reduced substantially in a few years, lent added attractiveness to proj-
ects eligible for rapid amortization. They also gave special encourage-
ment to borrowing to finance much of the costs, for interest expense
was deductible from taxable income. Thus, a corporation subject to a
marginal rate of tax of 70 per cent on any additional income would
find that its interest cost on money borrowed at 4 per cent was only
1.20 per cent, after allowance for taxes saved, whereas the dividends
it would have to offer on additional preferred or common stock were
not deductible from taxable income. Moreover, because a firm's bor-
rowing increased its invested capital credit under the excess profits tax,
the net effect of borrowing was sometimes to reduce its total tax
liability by an amount greater than the gross interest cost of the bor-
rowed funds.29
29See C. Miller, "Corporate Taxation and Methods of Corporate Financing," American
Economic Review, 42 (December 1952), 839—854.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENtTE 1313
4. Other forces including higher price level favor further debt expansion
Since most of or all the shortages accumulated during the depression
and World War II must now be presumed to have been made up, and
since the bulk of the more urgent and more profitable investment
projects stimulated by the Korean War and the emergency amortiza-
tion certificates also must be presumed to have been completed, a
slackening in the growth of nonfederal investment and debt, and even
occasional temporary reversals in trend, such as have occurred before,
would not be surprising.
Nevertheless, substantial average annual additions to the amount of
nonfederal debt outstanding seem probable for some time to come. In
the absence of other supporting evidence, or of evidence to the con-
trary, it would be reasonable to expect such additions because they
would be consistent with a long-established trend. As previously noted,
and as may be seen in detail in Table 6, total nonfederal interest-bear-
ing debt rose in twenty-five of the thirty-five years 1918—1953, and
nearly all the declines were concentrated in the Great Depression and
World War II. This long-term trend may be interpreted as reflecting
the strong tendency of our growing economy to make sizable net addi-
tions to its stocks of capital equipment and other goods in all tolerably
prosperous years and, because of a variety of factors in its institutional
organization, to finance a considerable fraction of the value of such
additions by borrowing. Nothing in the recent behavior of the economy
indicates any imminent weakening in these long-run tendencies. On the
contrary, various specific considerations suggest continuing strength.
We have noted that noncorporate residential and commercial mort-
gage debt rose by $60 billion in 1945—1953 and constituted the most
important component of long-term debt expansion in that period. The
availability of FHA and VA mortgages, with their potent attractions
of small down payments and long amortization periods for borrowers,
and of mortgage insurance or guaranty for lenders, was of outstandin.g
assistance in this expansion. These powerful aids to residential con-
struction and to the growth of mortgage debt are scheduled to con-
tinue. In legislation enacted in 1954, the minimum down payment
under FHA-insured mortgages was reduced to 5 per cent of the first
$9,000 of purchase price for new houses and 10 per cent for old houses,
plus 25 per cent of any excess for both new and old houses, subject to
a ceiling for insured mortgages of $20,000 on one- and two-family
homes, $27,500 for three-family homes, and $35,000 on four-family
homes.
Other forces besides the ease of finance promise to sustain the de-1314 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
mand for new dwellings (and the creation of mortgages) at a relatively
high level, though not necessarily or uninterruptedly at the record
levels of recent years. These include the high rate of population growth,
the continuing geographical shifts of our population to the Northwest
and the South, and the country-wide shift of population from the in-
teriors to the outskirts or suburbs of larger cities and towns.
The same population factors, accentuated by rising standards of
consumption, are creating enlarged demands upon state and local
governments for public works—schools, streets, highways, sewage and
water systems, etc. A considerable part of such expenditures is com-
monly financed by borrowing. The growth and movement of population
is similarly enlarging the requirements for new facilities of public
utility enterprises, which characteristically finance a substantial pro-
portion of additions to their invested capital by borrowing. Electric
light and power, gas, telephone, and pipeline, and other public utility
corporations accounted for nearly one-half, and, together with the
railroads, for 77 per cent, of the entire $36 billion par value of corpora-
tion bonds outstanding in the United States at the beginning of 1951
Stateand local government interest-bearing debt held outside of gov-
ernmental trust and sinking funds amounted to $24 bfflion at that time
and to $31 billion at the end of 1953.
For industrial corporations as well as public utility and railroad
enterprises, the rate and character of technological change will also
influence importantly the volume of new investment, and, therefore, of
debt creation. Two sources of change that may conceivably require
heavy investment in the relatively near future are the application of
atomic energy to civilian uses and the broadening application of
electronic machinery to industrial processes. Expressly intended to
stimulate new investment and speedier replacement of old buildings
and equipment were the optional provisions for the more rapid writing-
off of new buildings and equipment enacted in the Revenue Code of
1954.
Consumer installment credit, stimulated by the increasing variety of
popular durable consumer goods produced and by the still-growing
market for consumer paper among banks and specialized consumer
finance companies, which hold the bulk of it, promises to expand at
least as rapidly as disposable personal income. The amount outstanding
$3.2 billion to $2.5 billion in 1942—1945, when the output of
automobiles and other durable consumer goods was severely restricted
by wartime controls, but it increased nearly ninefold in the next nine
$0w•Braddock Hickman,TheVolume of Corporate Bond Financing 8jflC61900(National Bureau of
Economic Reaearch, 1953), Table A-i, pp. 250 if.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1315
years. The $22.2 billion outstanding at the end of 1953 equaled 8.9 per
cent of total disposable personal income in that year as compared with
5.4 per cent in 1939.
Because of the rise in the price level since 1939—retail prices ap-
proximately doubled in 1939—1953—the dollar amounts of increases in
the volume of outstanding debt will tend to be much greater than would
otherwise have been the case. The upward revaluation of durable old
assets, such as houses and other buildings, will tend to bring about an
enlargement of the debts outstanding against them, particularly as
they change hands; and the higher prices of new assets, assuming other
things equal, including an unchanged proportion of borrowing against
their costs, will lead to larger annual additions to the dollar volume of
debt that in the past. Houses that were formerly built and sold for
$6,000 and mortgaged for perhaps $4,500, now cost perhaps $12,000 to
build and, with FHA assistance, command mortgages as large as
$10,800 each. Thousands of old houses that still carry relatively modest
mortgages issued during or shortly after the Great Depression will
gradually pass into the hands of new owners at greatly increased
valuations and probably will become subject to much larger mortgage
debts.
As cities and states build additional schools and highways and make
other extensions of their physical plants to meet the requirements of an
expanding and shifting population and of higher standards for public
services, the cost of the new facilities in dollars per physical unit will
tend to be a good deal more than in the prewar period, perhaps two or
more times as much (assuming no significant cost saving through
technological advances); and, with an unchanged proportion of debt
financing, the new facilities would entail a correspondingly greater
amount of new debt. Maturing state and local government debt, in-
curred when prices were lower, will tend for this reason, other things
being equal, to be less than the new debt.
In the same way, the transmission and distribution lines, telephone
cables, pipelines, and buildings and machinery required by public
utilities to meet growth and regional shifts in demand for their services
will all tend to cost more than formerly per physical unit, and will
therefore tend to cause greater additions to debt than the same rate of
physical growth previously occasioned. In some instances it is likely
that current depreciation charges based upon historical cost will be
found inadequate, among industrial as well as public utility enter-
prises, to provide for the eventual replacement of various types of
capital assets, with the result that greater resort will have to be had to
retained earnings and new issues of securities, including debt issues.1316 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
At the same time the borrowing power of many enterprises will be
enhanced because their old debts will constitute a reduced fraction of
the present value of their assets, and their debt charges, a reduced
fraction of their current earning power.
5. Increasing demand for debt securities by financial institutions
The growth of debt is promoted not oniy by the existence of attrac-
tive investment opportunities for borrowers but also by increases in the
power and disposition of lenders to lend. Financial institutions make an
important contribution in this respect by mobilizing the savings of
thousands of individuals and assuming the responsibility and risks of
investing them. Favorable to a continuing growth in debt, therefore, is
the expanding volume of both voluntary and contractual or compulsory
saving and investing by individuals through organizations whose in-
vestments characteristically consist mainly of fixed-interest obligations.
A major example is life insurance. As estimated by the Institute of
Life Insurance, the total admitted assets of life insurance companies,
largely bonds and mortgages, rose by approximately $40 billion, or
more than 100 per cent, between 1943 and 1953, and have been growing
in the last few years by more than $5 billion a year. Some, though not
all, of this increase is doubtless to be ascribed to the rise in the general
price level and in the level of wages and salaries, which encouraged
individuals to take out larger insurance policies; but the dollar volume
of premium receipts and of funds becoming available for investment is
now geared to the higher price level.
The recent and continuing growth of private pension funds in busi-
ness is another example. The following figures, taken from a study pre-
pared for the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report
by the National Planning Association (Pensions in the United States,
1952),indicatethe scale of the recent expansion in private pension
plans:
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
AND NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED
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In the same study it was estimated that employers and employees
contributed over $2 billion in 1951 to private pension plans, from which
perhaps $300 million was paid out; that contributions under govern-
ment programs, other than the old-age and survivors insurance trust
fund and other than under programs for the armed forces, amounted
to $2.1 billion, with benefit payments approximating $1 billion; and
that the net increase in the old-age and survivors insurance trust fund
in 1952 approximated $2 billion. Ida C. Merriam, of the Social Security
Administration, estimated that employer contributions to private pen-
sion plans in 1954 were at the rate of about $2.3 billion a year, employee
contributions, $0.5 billion, current annual additions to private pension
fund reserves, about $2.4 billion, and the accumulated reserves, about
$17 billion.3' Although sizable amounts of the private pension fund
reserves may come to be invested in equity ownership of rental proper-
ties and in common and preferred stocks, it seems probable that a large
part of these reserves, as well as all the reserves of public pension plans,
will be invested in interest-bearing obligations. At the end of 1954,
corporate and government bonds comprised 73 percent of the non-
cash assets of all uninsured pension funds of U. S. corporations other
than banks, insurance companies, and railroads; common stocks, 19
percent; and preferred stocks and other assets, roughly 4 percent each
(S.E.C. Release no. 1335, Oct. 12, 1955).
The widespread adoption of the practice of providing in mortgage
contracts for monthly installment payments on the principal, relatively
rare until t.he establishment of the FIIA, is likewise producing a large
amount of contractual saving by individuals, most of it adding to the
inflow of funds to institutions and to the pressure upon them to seek
replacement investments. Not all of these installment principal pay-
ments represent net saving in an economic sense, of course, because de-
preciation and obsolescence of the buildings must be allowed for. But
the equal monthly amortization payments, after the firstseveral
years, are usually larger than the concurrent loss in the economic value
of the property, even when the mortgage loans are for as long as thirty
years. Moreover, the amount of funds flowing to lenders is determined
by the gross, not the net, saving incorporated in installment payments
of principal. Because these principal repayments reduce the volume of
outstanding debt by the same amounts that they supply funds for new
debt, they obviously do not contribute directly to an expansion of debt.
On the contrary, by themselves, they constitute a major kind of debt
reduction. But the daily receipt of huge amounts of such payments by
81Ina paper entitled "Social Security Programs and Economic Stability," presented at the Uni-
versities-National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on policies to combat depressions, May 15,
1954.1318 AMERICANSTATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1055
TABLE 26
INVESTMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS IN SAVINGS ACCOUNTS,



























1920 1,741 4,806 10,546 166 761 5,488 23,508—
1921 1,965 5,541 11,079 148 652 5,893 25,278 1,770
1922 2,210 5,085 12,289 135 730 6,360 27,709 2,431
1923 2,626 6,484 13,656 135 373 6,981 30,255 2,546
1924 3,153 6,912 15,044 137 411 7,706 33,363 3,108
1925 3,811 7,349 16,314 138 376 8,592 36,580 3,217
1926 4,378 7,799 17,237 143 356 9,594 39,507 2,927
1927 5,027 8,352 18,674 153 245 10,648 43,099 3,592
1928 5,762 8,731 19,295 158 95 11,782 45,823 2,724
1929 6,237 8,797 19,165 169— 12,801 47,169 1,346
1930 6,296 9,384 18,647 250— 13,690 48,267 1,098
1931 5,916 9,939 15,955 613— 14,293 46,716 —1,551
1932 5,326 9,890 12,101 915— 14,319 42,551—4,165
1933 4,750 9,506 10,979 1,229— 14,613 41,077—1,474
1934 4,458 9,670 11,992 1,232— 15,687 43,039 1,962
1935 4,254 9,829 12,899 1,229 15317,203 45,587 2,528
1936 4,194 10,013 13,709 1,291 475 18,736 48,418 2,851
1937 4,080 10,126 14,410 1,303 984 20,181 51,064 2,646
1938 4,077 10,235 14,427 1,286 1,442 21,512 52,979 1,915
1939 4,118 10,481 14,865 1,315 1,900 23,024 55,703 2,724
1940 4,322 10,618 15,403 1,342 2,800 24,663 59,148 3,445
1941 4,682 10,490 15,523 1,392 5,400 26,592 64,079 4,931
1942 4,941 10,621 16,058 1,459 13,400 28,734 75,211 11,132
1943 5,494 11,707 19,001 1,837 24,700 31,365 94,104 18,893
1944 6,305 13,332 23,871 2,406 38,200 34,212 116,326 22,222
1945 7,385 15,332 29,929 3,013 42,900 37,509136,048 19,722
1946 8,548 16,813 33,447 3,379 44,200 40,713 147,100 11,052
1947 0,753 17,744 34,694 8,523 46,200 43,820 155,734 8,634
1948 10,984 18,385 34,970 3,442 47,800 47,139 162,700 6,966
1949 12,471 19,269 35,145 3,302 49,300 50,231 169,718 7,018
1950 13,978 20,002 35,200 3,035 49,600 53,630 175,445 5,727
1951 16,073 20,880 36,592 2,808 49,100 57,140 182,593 7,148
1952 19,143 22,578 39,331 2,650 49,200 81,140 194,042 11,449
22,823 24,345 42,001 2,466 49,300 65,500 206,435 12,393
Investments in savingsandloan associations including savingsaccounts,deposits and invest-
ment securities. Doesnot include sharespledged against mortgage loans or investments by United States
government. Source: Home Loan Bank Board.
bTimedeposits.Source: Comptroller of the Currency, 1920—1927; National Association of Mutual
SavingsBanks,1928—1947; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (time deposits of individuals,
partnershipsand corporations), 1948 to date.
0Timedeposits of individuals, partnerships and corporations. Source: Comptroller of the Currency,
1920—1947; and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1948 to date.INTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1319
institutional lenders exerts a potent, continuing pressure upon the
latter to seek new loans. This pressure is favorable to freer lending and
easier borrowing. And it is not unlikely that the widespread use of the
monthly repayment house mortgage induces many of the home buyers
to save more than they would save otherwise, for an expanding equity
in a mortgaged house does not adequately serve all the purposes of
individuals' saving—it is not a ready source of liquid funds, for example.
The increasing amount of saving and indirect individual investment
that is compulsory under the social security system and most private
pension plans and that is contractual under life insurance policies
doubtless takes place to some extent at the expense of individuals'
direct investments. But the restricted availability of pension rights as
a source of liquid funds prior to an individual's retirement renders
them an inadequate substitute for direct personal investments. Be-
cause of their special objectives, the same is generally true, though in
smaller degree, of life insurance policies. It would not be surprising,
therefore, if the effect of these institutional developments, as of the
installment payment home mortgage, is to promote a net increase in
personal saving and investment. To the extent that such increase takes
the form of additional deposits in savings or checking accounts with
banks and shares in building and loan associations, the volume of funds
seeking fixed-interest investments through financial intermediaries
would be increased further—barring a radical change in the predomi-
nant type of investment sought by financial institutions. Finally, unless
material changes in law are made or large gold discoveries occur, in-
creases in the country's supply of money to meet the needs of an ex-
panding population and output will require substantially equal addi-
tions to the amount of debt securities purchased by the banking system.
It is striking to note that individuals raised their current additions
to their holdings of savings accounts, United States saving bonds, and
life insurance reserves from an average of $2.6 billion a year in the
prosperous 1920's, and $0.9 billion in the depressed 1930's, to $11.4
billion a year in the 1940's, and $9.2 billion a year in the four years
1950—1953, inclusive (Table 26).
d Due depositors: Outstanding principal and accrued interest on certilicates of deposits, outstanding
savings and unclaimed deposits. Source: Poet Offtce Department.
Current redemption value of savings held by individuals at year-end: War Savings Securitice,
1920—1928; and United States savings bonds, 1935 to date. Does not include holdings of corporations.
unincorporated businesses, pension funds, etc. Source: Treasury Department.
'Accumulations in United States legal reserve life insurance companies include reserves plus divi-
dends left to accumulate, minus premium notes and policy loans. Source: Inetituts of Life Insurance.
Preliminary estimates.
Note: Does not include savings accounts in credit unions which amounted to approximately
$1,500 million at the close of 1953.
Source: Operating Analysis Division, Home Loan Bank Board.1320 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
Not all the expanding resources of financial intermediaries will seek
fixed-interest investments. A small proportion of the funds of life in-
surance companies, for example, is being invested in income-producing
real estate and in common stocks. Private pension funds, because they
are much less subject to statutory restrictions in this regard, may even-
tually devote a substantial fraction of their resources to equity invest-
ments. The number and resources of investment trusts designed pri-
marily for investments in common stocks are increasing. But it appears
safe to say that the greater part of the aggregate investment resources
of financial intermediaries will continue to seek fixed-interest securities
for many years to come.
6. Debt creation and prosperity
The considerations reviewed thus far do not prove that the volume
of interest-bearing debt outstanding will necessarily rise, on the aver-
age, over the next ten or fifteen years, but they offer ground for believ-
ing such a rise to be likely. The rise will almost certainly take place if
our economy avoids serious depression. This is true because a good level
of business activity, by creating bright prospects, itself stimulates in-
vestment and aggregate borrowing. It is also true that a substantial
increase in debt commonly functions as a major stimulus to prosperity.
It contributes vitally to prosperity by financing important amounts of
capital expenditures without which a high level of economic activity
cannot readily be achieved. Prosperity usually requires a large volume
of capital expenditures both because a sizable portion of our industrial
plant and labor force is more or less specialized, in the short run, for
producing buildings, machinery, and other capital goods (or the
equivalent in military goods), and because our population desires not
to spend all its income for perishable consumer goods but to use some
of it for long-lasting capital and consumer goods and to acquire claims
against the future—much of them in the legal form of debts. If the
capital goods segment of our economy is not active, the consumption
goods industries will also not be able to operate at full throttle, for they
are geared to make and sell enough of their products for us all, including
those in the capital goods industries, not only for their own employees
and stockholders.
In spite of the well-founded traditional concern about the dangers
of a large debt both to the debtors and to society at large,32 an expand-
ing volume of debt as our economy grows would seem to be necessary
"Thedangers of debt obligations arise mainly from their inflexibility. The essential purpose of a
debt contract from the standpoint is to provide a margin of protection for his claims to interest
income and principal against the unavoidable risks and fluctuations of ownership of tangible property
or of shares in business enterprises. For this protection he is willing to accept a limited and usuallyINTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1321
for the full functioning of our economic institutions. By the purchase of
various kinds of debt securities, both directly and through financial
institutions, individuals are enabled to satisfy their desire to obtain
definite and protected claims against the future in return for making
available a portion of their current incomes to business corporations,
governments, and others; and the latter, by productive use of the bor-
rowed funds, help to maintain the nation's incomes and employment at
a high level in the present, and place themselves in a position to meet
the future obligations assumed as they mature. So long as the public
continues to buy additions to its holdings of life insurance, pension and
annuity contracts, and other fixed claims to money, there willbea de-
mand by financial intermediaries for additional debt securities—bar-
ring a radical change in the predominant type of investment sought by
financial institutions. Similarly, as previously noted, unless we have
material changes in law or large gold discoveries, increases in the
country's supply of money to meet the needs of a growing population
and output wifi require substantially equal additions to the amount of
debt securities held by the commercial banks.
Direct ownership of land, buildings, machinery, and other tangible
assets, or of shares of common stock in business enterprises, also pro-
vides claims on the future. Because such claims are not in fixed dollar
amounts nor fixed in time, but vary with the incomes, dividend decla-
rations, and capital values actually realized, downward movements in
their amounts from time to time are more or less expected and do not
usually give rise to difficulties as serious as those resulting from defaults
of fixed-debt contracts. For this reason, the financial organization of
society may be said to be less vulnerable to adverse developments when
claims on the future take the form of equity ownership predominantly
and fixed debts are small.
As indicated above, however, the prevailing customs and practices
of our population and our financial institutions with respect to saving
and investment appea1r to favor the creation of a growing volume of
debt. Well-informed lenders may be expected in self-protection to
strive to limit the total amount and the maturities of each of their
individual loans to sums judged to be well within the capacity of the
lower rate of return. But the creditor's secured position is obtained by increasing the risks of the debtor.
The latter's promises are usually unconditional as to timing, leaving him little or no room for adjusting
to temporary adversity. Because of the large volume of short-term debt from Borne business enterprises
to others, and from business enterprises as a whole to the commercial banks, and because of the general
tendency of creditors to try to reduce credit in troubled times, defaults can easily become contagious.
Severe and often fatal may then be created for many debtors (and their creditors) who would
have surmounted their troubles if given more time. If the defaults are sufficiently large and widespread,
they may do severe damage to financial confidence, and thereby impede for a more or less protracted
period the ready flow of fresh money savings into new investment.1322 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
borrower,and to the extent that such lending policies are followed
generally, the risks are lessened. But protection against the principal
hazards of a large debt structure—panics and prolonged depressions
that weaken even strong debtors—is more likely to be found in public
policies designed to prevent or mitigate them, notably monetary poli-
cies.
7. Interest Rates
While the considerations reviewed thus far offer ground for believing
that the volume of interest-bearing debt is likely to rise for some years
to come, such a rise need not be accompanied by an increase in direct
personal interest income. Whether the latter will also rise wifi depend
partly on the movements in the level and structure of interest rates and
partly on the extent to which individuals enlarge or ieduce their direct
holdings of government and corporate bonds, mortgages, and savings
deposits. Without venturing a strong opinion on the probable direction
of near- and intermediate-term changes in interest rates, we may note
that the considerations cited below appear to indicate that a change in
either direction is likely to be held to moderate proportions.
We have previously noted that interest rates on new issues of corpo-
rate and governmental debt securities and market yields on old issues
fell almost continuously between 1932 and 1946 (Chart 3). Beginning
in the first quarter of 1946, interest rates began an irregular two-year
upward movement. A renewed decline in the three following years left
long-term rates modestly above their 1946 lows. Then a sharp rise in
1951 and another in the first half of 1953 brought them to the highest
levels in ten years. Between the beginning of 1946 and the middle of
1953 the average market yield of all marketable long-term Treasury
bonds advanced from 2.21 to 3.09 per cent; that of Moody's Aaa corpo-
rate bonds rose from 2.54 to 3.40 per cent. The Treasury Department
raised the interest rates offered on United States savings bonds sold
after April 30, 1952, and, for succeeding periods, on the amounts of
previous issues maturing after that date that are not tendered for early
cash redemption.
The hardening of interest rates was checked and reversed in the
second half of 1953 as the combined result of a recession in business
activity and of actions taken by the Federal Reserve authorities to
increase the free reserves of commercial banks. In December 1954 the
market yields of long-term federal and high-grade corporate bonds
were roughly midway between their lows of the spring of 1946 and their
highs of June 1953.
It is possible to conjecture that the net rise since 1946 may be onlyINTEREST AS INCOME AND TA,X REVENUE 1323
the first leg of a long-term ascending movement. Chart 9, similar to one
used by RaymondGoldsmith in connection with an unpublished ad-
dress, depicts the course of yields on high-grade long-term corporate
bonds for the last century. It will be noted that the twenty-five-year
downward movement in interest rates that culminated in 1946
been preceded by a twenty-two-year period of
had
rising interest rates,
1899—192 1, and that the latter rise, in turn, had been preceded by a
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though it obviously does not establish, that we began the ascending arc
of long cycle of interest rate movements in 1946 and that the upward
movement might continue for another decade or more.
But it would be dangerous to rely heavily upon historical parallelism
in this connection. Notable changes have occurred in the central bank-
ing organization of the United States and other countries. These have
diminished dependence upon gold as a source and regulator of the
quantity of money and bank credit. The changes have correspondingly
increased the power and disposition of the central banking authorities
to deliberately influence interest rates by altering the amount and cost
of the reserves they make available to commercial banks.
In the use of their discretionary powers, moreover, central banking
authorities have been and are stifi subject to strong pressures of
opinion in favor of low interest rates. During the Great Depression the
deliberate promotion and maintenance of low interest rates became an
avowed objective of many governments, first as an antidepression ex-
pedient, then as a long-run measure to combat secular unemployment.
There was a striking shift of concern and emphasis on the part of many
scholars and public officials from the problems of short-run cyclical
instability in prices and business to the long-run difficulties of main-
taining a high level of employment and output. Where depressions were
once regarded as brief interludes in the steady march of economic prog-
ress, even to be welcomed in mild doses for their cathartic action upon
the inefficiencies and wastes that developed during booms, they came
to be regarded by many as an inveterate tendency of our economy, a
ceaseless threat that needs to be combatted by all manner of direct and
rearguard action. Frequent central banking adjustments in both direc-
tions had commended themselves highly when credit policy was
viewed as the helmsman steering the economy through a very narrow
channel between inflation and depression. But when fear of a secular
tendency toward depression took hold, there was concern that the
effects of restrictive short-run credit policies might long outlast the
occasioning circumstances and reinforce this long-run tendency. A
continuous promotive policy, with low interest rates a prominent fea-
ture, therefore came to be advocated by some.
In the changed economic climate of the years 1939—1953, this type of
thought receded from prominence. The 95 per cent rise in the gross
national product of the United States (in constant prices) between the
first and last year of this period (accompanying an increase in the
civilian labor force of 15 per cent) did much to erase the former fears of
long-run tendencies toward depression. At the same time, the doubling
of the price level—the consumer price index rose 92 per cent and theINTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1325
wholesale price index, 120 per cent—again demonstrated the reality of
the danger of inflation under favoring conditions. Faith in the useful-
ness of a restrictive monetary policy in appropriate circumstances was
restored to many who had lost it.
Nevertheless the Great Depression left an abiding legacy of public
concern about maintaining a high level of employment, and a readiness
to use the powers of government to this end—as evidenced by the
declaration of congressional policy in the Employment Act of 1946.
Monetary policy in the form of actions designed to avoid or reverse
undue credit stringency is looked to by many to provide the first and
most desirable method of defense against incipient business depres-
sions. It seems reasonable to believe, therefore, that although the
Federal Reserve authorities will doubtless permit market forces to
move interest rates upward when loan and investment demands are
heavy, and wifi find it necessary to deliberately restrict credit and
thereby raise interest rates from time to time in order to limit specula-
tive excesses or inflationary developments, they will have powerful
motives to moderate upward movements in interest rates.
Moreover, there is some evidence that the financial markets and
business generally are highly sensitive to the degree of credit restraint
required under present conditions to produce more than moderate
absolute advances in interest rates. The greatly enlarged volume of
marketable securities held by commercial banks and other institutions
tends to exert an influence in this direction because even small in-
creases in interest rates cause sizable reductions in the market value of
their holdings of medium- and long-term bonds. And even moderate
advances in long-term market yields tend to shrink the volume of
funds available from private sources for government-sponsored lending
programs, such as FHA and VA.
The degree of credit restraint needed to produce a sizable advance in
interest rates must be sufficient to overcome the depressive influence
upon yields of the great and growing institutional demand for
high-grade obligations previously discussed—a demand that is fed to an
important degree by the contractual and nOncontractual current liquid
savings of individuals. Under these conditions, it may well be that a
degree of deliberate credit restraint which causes relatively small abso-
lute advances in interest rates may be adequate for policy purposes.
It may be noted that the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the
Federal Reserve authorities in the early months of 1953, in conjunction
with the restrictive debt management policy of the Treasury (the
offering of a long-term bond issue), had, in the words of the January
1954 Economic Report of the President, "... amore potent effect than1326 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
wasgenerally expected." Yet the peak average monthly yield of
Moody's Aaa corporate bonds (in June 1953) was only slightly more
than 0.4 per cent higher than eighteen months before; and the 3.40 per
cent average yield in that peak month was little more than one-half the
peak levels of 1920 or 1921, and substantially below the lowest average
annual yield of these bonds in any year between 1919 and 1935 (Table
6, Chart 3). The moderateness of the absolute rise in interest rates in
1951—1953 is the more impressive because the three-year period was one
of new high records in the volume of private investment and borrowing.
Illustrating the sensitivity of long-term interest rates on the down-
side to a softening in the business situation and to credit-easing actions
of the Federal Reserve authorities was the rapid retraction in the
twelve months ended in June 1954 of about one-half of the previous
seven-year net advance in long-term interest rates. The Reserve System
was quick to purchase about $1 billion of Treasury bills in the open
market in May and June 1953, and to announce, late in June, a reduc-
tion in the percentage reserve requirements of member banks. These
two measures added somewhat more than $2 billion to the lendable
reserves of the banks.
The improvement in the "quality" of large amounts of debt that re-
sults from better information about borrowers, greater mobility of in-
vestment funds, FHIA insurance, and VA guarantees also operates to
reduce effective interest rates. Aided by telephone and telegraph com-
munication and a nationwide network of dealers and brokers in debt
securities, and lending agents for insurance companies, the institutional
demand makes funds available at competitive rates to areas and bor-
rowers, physically remote from the central money markets, that for-
merly paid higher rates by reason of their distance. The effective rates
of interest on obligations not widely known, but otherwise of good
quality, though rising and falling with other interest rates, are now
less likely than formerly to make exaggerated responses to tighter
money markets. Mortgages insured under the FHA or guaranteed by
the Veterans' Administration are not limited to a purely local market;
and even uninsured mortgages, wherever issued, may tap through local
lending agents the resources of insurance companies operating on a
national scale. The effect of these developments is to promise a large
and continuing demand for the obligations of lesser-known borrowers
and to reduce that fraction of the so-called interest rate which actually
represents compensation for risk, restricted marketabifity, and re-
stricted access to lenders.
On the other hand, although downward movements of interest rates
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mands by borrowers and to deliberate action of the Federal Reserve
authorities, a decline to the very low levels of the middle 1940's appears
unlikely. These levels were reached in unusual conditions. A combina-
tion of a depression of greater intensity and duration than had been
previously experienced and huge additions to our banking reserves
through imports of gold from Europe had driven interest rates down
with little interruption from 1932 to 1940. Then, during most of the
1940's, direct government controls over steel, copper, and other vital
materials restricted private demands for borrowed funds, while the
needs of war finance encouraged an easy-money policy on the part of
the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury. In the absence of a
major war or a severe and prolonged depression, it appears unlikely
either that Federal Reserve policy would seek a similar degree of
monetary ease or that other forces would bring it about. Supporting
the likelihood of firmer interest rates in the intermediate future than
the levels that obtained during the middle 1940's, at least, is the greatly
enlarged demand for capital funds by industry, state and local govern—
ments, the housing market, and foreign countries.
8. Recent upturn in direct monetary interest income of individuals likely
to continue, but to lag behind growth in total personal interest income,
direct and indirect
Even if greater changes in interest rates should occur than those here
contemplated, they would affect the total of individuals' monetary
interest income only gradually and far less than proportionally in the
near- and intermediate-term future. One reason for this is that the
average rate of interest received by individual investors on their total
holdings naturally moves more slowly than the market rate because
the new rates are obtained oniy on the new components of investors'
total holdings. A second reason is that a considerable fraction of indi-
viduals' interest-yielding investments is in forms that are relatively
slow to respond to changes in market rates of interest. At the end of
1953, $91.6 bfflion of individuals' interest-bearing investments con-
sisted of savings accounts with commercial banks, mutual savings
banks, savings and loan associations, and the postal savings system
(Table 26). An additional $49.3 billion was in United States savings
bonds. Mortgages accounted for about $23 billion.83 If we assume that
individuals at the end of 1953 owned approximately the same propor-
Federal Reeerve Bullelin, June 1954, p. 629. The estimate is a residual for individuals 'and othor&'
derived by subtracting from the estimated total mortgage debt outstanding the amounts held by coin-
mercial banks, trust companies, mutual savings banks, life insurance companies, building and loan
associations, HOLC, FNMH, and VA. Some mortgages held by other federal agencies and by
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tions of outstanding marketable bonds of all kinds as in Goldsmith's
estimates for 1949, such securities constituted 44 per cent of their total
interest-bearing investments
With the prospect of a further expansion in interest-bearing debt,
and of an average interest rate not more than moderately different from
the prevailing one, personal monetary interest income is likely to in-
crease in the near- and intermediate-term future. But the growth in
individuals' direct monetary receipts of interest is likely to lag behind
that in total personal interest income.
Between 1943 and 1953, the direct monetary interest income of mcli-
viduals and nonprofit organizations rose each year (Table 11). The
annual amount moved up from $3.4 to $7.5 bfflion during the decade.
The increase in total personal interest income, monetary and imputed,
as measured by the Department of Commerce, was considerably greater
absolutely, and somewhat greater proportionally, the annual amount
rising from $5.8 to $13.5 billion. The latter figures, as previously noted,
include not only the direct monetary interest received by individuals
and nonprofit organizations, but also the value of services performed
for them by financial institutions, the value being measured by the
amount of the latter's net property income expended to provide such
services.
Individuals will doubtless acquire directly some portion of the con-
tinuing increases in the total of mortgage obligations, public utility and
other corporate bonds, and state and local obligations, although finan-
cial institutions may be expected to be the principal purchasers. A
further increase in individuals' interest receipts will tend to occur as
portions of their existing holdings of bonds that were acquired when
interest rates were lower mature and the proceeds are reinvested—un-
less interest rates should lose their net rise of the last several years.
Individuals would also be likely to enlarge their holdings of United
States government securities, possibly at the expense of equity invest-
ments or savings deposits, if the Treasury were to refund with long-
term bonds any substantial amounts of the large short-term federal
debt now held mainly by banks, other financial institutions, and busi-
ness corporations.
But several influences will tend to moderate the growth of individuals'
direct monetary interest receipts in the near- and intermediate-term
future. One of these is the volume of home mortgage repayments. For
millions of relatively recent home purchasers, earlier-than-scheduled
repayments of installments on the principal of their mortgage loans will
offer a more attractive rate of return (in the form of reduced interestINTEREST AS INCOME AND TAX REVENUE 1329
charges)than the alternative investments open to them, and will be
preferred on other grounds as well. The increase in home-mortgage
indebtedness outstanding in recent years has been accompanied by a
substantial and rising volume of "apparent" retirements—"apparent"
because the figures include old mortgages paid off with the proceeds of
new mortgage loans as well as other full payments, partial prepay-
ments, and regular amortization. The figures for recent years are as
follows
MORTGAGE LENDING ON 1- TO 4-FAMILY NONFARM HOUSES














1949 11.8 7.6 4.2 37.5
1950 16.2 8.6 7.6 45.1
1951 16.4 9.6 6.8 51.9
1952 18.0 11.2 6.8 58.7
1953 19.7 12.5 7.2 65.9
Although the available data do not permit ready separation of repay-
ments through mortgage refinancing from repayment through other
means, it is clear that the latter will shortly reach sizable amounts be-
cause most of the large volume of home mortgages made in recent years
calls for complete extinction of the debt through monthly payments
over a period of from fifteen to thirty years.
Related to the foregoing in some respects is the possibility of heavy
cash redemptions of United States savings bonds issued in the last year
of World War II and the several following years, now approaching
maturity. Although the Treasury offered a ten-year extension of ma-
turity at a slightly higher interest rate to all holders of the maturing E
bonds, and automatically extended the maturity of E bonds not pre-
sented for cash redemption or exchange, a large proportion of the bonds
Operating Analysis Division, Home Loan Bank Board, and Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The aNew Loans are actually recorded nonfarm mortgages of $20,000 or less. At present
there is no reliable method of identifying the relatively small proportion of mortgages over $20,000, but
these omissions appear to be approximately compensated by small nonresidential loans and junior
mortgages of less than $20,000 on larger than 1- to 4-family nonfarm houses and nonresidential property.
Although precise estimates on home mortgage lending are not available, the recording series provides a
very good gauge of the amount of permanent financing activity for all 1- to 4-family nonfarin homes.
Prior to 1951 when the Home Loan Bank Board prepared direct estimates of new loans on 1- to 4-family
nonfarm houses, the differences in our data, for the years 1949 and 1950, exceeded the old series by 0.8
and 0.2 billion respectively, about 7 and 1 per cent for these two overlapping years.1330 AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, DECEMBER 1955
maturing in 1952 and 1953 was presented for cash redemption. One use
for the funds so obtained is reduction of a home-mortgage debt.
Complicating the effect of savings bond redemptions on individuals'
cash interest income is the fact that many holders will realize interest
from the bonds for the first time in a legal sense when they turn them in
for redemption. In other words, because most holders chose not to re-
port their accruing discount until redemption, the act of reducing their
interest-yielding assets will temporarily increase their interest income.
Conceivably, by more generous terms or more aggressive promotional
efforts, the Treasury could maintain or increase the importance of sav-
ings bonds as a source of personal interest receipts. It succeeded in
maintaining the aggregate amount held by individuals at somewhat
above $49 billion, measured by current redemption value, in 1950—1953,
a period in which redemptions ran between $5 and $6 billion annually.
In the same four years, it may be noted, individuals increased their
savings accounts in banks, building and loan associations, and the
postal savings system by $21.4 billion (Table 26).
Continuing to contest with savings bonds and other direct interest-
yielding investments for the savings of individuals will be such invest-
ment intermediaries as life insurance companies and pension funds,
most of whose interest earnings are not paid out as such. In the same
four-year period, 1950—1953, in which individuals' holdings of savings
bonds remained stationary, the reserves of life insurance companies
rose by $15.3 billion, and those of private pension funds by perhaps
one-half as much.
The amounts of interest income reported by individuals for income
tax purposes may conceivably increase much more than their total
interest receipts in the intermediate-term future. Because of the im-
portant degree of underreporting of interest on tax returns, stricter en-
forcement procedures may result in substantial additions to the
amount of personal interest reported. As in Great Britain, such pro-
cedures might conceivably include provision for the deduction at the
source and remittance to the Treasury by all important payers of
interest of an amount equal to the first bracket tax rate on all interest
payments. Even in the absence of such specific procedures, more
thorough education of taxpayers and more comprehensive examination
of tax returns may yield important results.